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An Analysis on the Navy's Defense Planning based on the potential phenomenon of Arms Races in Southeast Asia and the Minimum Essentials Force Strategy

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Abstract. Indonesia as an archipelagic country which has thousand islands and an area of two-thirds of the total territorial waters as well as a strategic geographical location is very vulnerable to military and non-military threats. Thus, Indonesia should be providing an appropriate defense development methods to build its military strength, especially the Indonesian Navy, in order to make it capable to deal with the phenomenon of arms races in the Southeast Asia region and to protect Indonesian maritime jurisdiction from existing threats and conflicts. The research method used is descriptive with a qualitative approach. The results of this study are that arms races have become a phenomenon that can be destabilize the Southeast Asia security which is classified into several levels ranging from very low, low, moderate, high and very high, based on 8 (eight) factors as indicators of classification and definition. arms races; Minimum Essential Forces (MEF) is a national development mandate in the field of defense and security as well as a strategy used by the Government of Indonesia to enhance the capabilities and strength of the TNI, which is based on 3 (three) main components, such as capability based planning, threat based planning and flash points; and the Naval Concept of Operations (Conops) can be used as an additional component to harmonizes the 3 (three) main components that make up the MEF in order to create a professional and modern Navy with regional projection capabilities and global commitment.

Keywords. Indonesian Navy, Arms Races, Defense Planning, Minimum Essential Forces

Introduction

Southeast Asia waters play a very important role and have strategic values for regional countries, especially in the context of economy, sea communication and transportation as well as maritime security area. Maritime security issues itself is a very problematic to solve because it is transnational in nature and takes on an unstable state condition. Historically, the Southeast Asia region has a very high potential conflicts, giving rise to various traditional and non-traditional maritime security threats. The concept of security with a traditional approach is a condition of being free from military threats or the ability of a country to protect its territorial from military attacks originating from outside the country (Buzan, 1991). In addition, Barry Buzan (1991) tries to understand security from a constructivist perspective, so Buzan reveals that there is a security concept with a non-traditional approach, where regional security does not only focus on regional security through the military sector, but more broadly includes the security sector, economy and environment. The concept of non-traditional security is no longer

merely about interstate relations, but has looked at individual security. These conditions are related to the national interest of a country, but will always intersect with the interests of other countries.

In order to achieve comprehensive national defense and security, each country has made efforts to improve its military capabilities through the development of weapons, in order to be able to face threats that are both traditional and non-traditional. Felix Heiduk (2017) explains in a research paper entitled “An arms race in Southeast Asia? Changing arms dynamics, regional security and the role of European arms exports” that military expenditures for Vietnam, Indonesia and Cambodia have doubled between 2005 and 2015. Meanwhile, military spending in Thailand and the Philippines also increased sharply. The rapid development of weapons by several countries in Southeast Asia is an unavoidable fact. Stockholm International Peace Research (SIPRI) noted that the military spending of Southeast Asian countries increased by an average of more than 5 percent in 2015 and military spending increased by an average of 57 percent. This has attracted the attention of various parties, namely economic, political and mass media observers (Felix Heiduk, 2017). Some analysts and researchers argue that among countries in the Southeast Asian region there have been arms races as a form of reaction to the development of a country's military power which is then followed by other countries around it. Anders Wivel (2011) explains that there are situations where the state takes action to improve state security to focus on maintaining the security and sustainability of its country through the procurement of weapons and the development of military technology. These situations and conditions are actually very natural because a country always has a national interest in state security, but a dilemma arises when there is a question, "whether a country that is increasing its military capability will attack that country in the future”.

Based on this, a country must have an appropriate defense planning concept in order to deal with the worst possible situation, namely conflicts with other countries. Michael J. Mazarr, et al (2019) explained that the defense planning approach is guided by the National Security Strategy (NSS); National Defense Strategy (NDS); and the National Military Strategy (NMS). Then at an early stage, defense planning methods can be demand or supply based. In general, defense planning activities tend to be demand-based, in the form of strategies, capabilities and capacities based on ideas about potential future engagements. The idea comes from the desired threat or capability or a combination of the two. The concept has been adopted by the Government of Indonesia in preparing the Minimum Essential Forces (MEF), in which there are 3 (three) main components, namely, capability based planning, threat based planning and flash points. These three components have played a very significant role in increasing Indonesia's defense and military forces. However, the researcher analyzes that there are still shortcomings that must be corrected in the components that make up the MEF, so that the ongoing implementation of the MEF stage III can be more optimal. Researchers offer the Naval Conops as an additional component that can cover the shortcomings of the three main components of the existing MEF. There are several reasons that underlie why the Naval Conops is the right component to optimize the MEF in improving the capabilities of the Indonesian military, especially for Indonesian Navy (Tentara Nasional Indonesia/TNI Angkatan Laut).

The first is the emergence of the phenomenon of arms races as a form of action-reaction that occurs between several countries in the Southeast Asian region that have a desire to increase their military strength and national defense and are known as the spiral model. The interaction in the spiral model eventually led to reciprocal actions which then became an incentive for countries in Southeast Asia to continue to build military strength, especially a superior Navy. Efforts to increase defense budgets carried out by countries in Southeast Asia have had a significant impact, especially on the naval combat capability of countries in Southeast Asia

through the acquisition of warships that have high fire power in the operational mandala. One of them is the Frigate type ship, which trend continues to increase in number. The technology of sensors, weapons, command and control owned by these types of ships is also continuously updated according to the rapid development of technology. The comparison of naval power owned by Indonesia is included in the large category in Southeast Asia. In 2020, in terms of quantity, Indonesia has the most Frigate type warships with 11 ships, followed by Malaysia with 10 ships and Thailand with 9 ships, so that from a total of 31 frigates in Southeast Asia in 2010 the number has increased to 40 in 2020. This number has increased by about 22% in the last 10 years. In addition, several countries in Southeast Asia are also strengthening their Fleet capabilities with other types of ships.

Second, because Indonesia is a country that has a strategic geographical position and has great natural resource potential, it is in a position as the Center of Gravity (CoG) and The Global Supply Chain System. This condition causes Indonesia to experience threats, disturbances and obstacles that have implications for the country's maritime security. This position must be supported by a strong defense and security system and change the pattern of national development which is not only oriented to the land dimension but also to the sea dimension. Further explained by Y. Paongan, R.M. Zulkipli and Kirana (2012) that Indonesia's position in this position has 4 (four) of the 9 (nine) Sea Lanes of Communication as choke points in the world. It makes Indonesia as a strategic junction for international shipping; fishing; potential business; and as a strategic key partner for big countries. This has brought logical consequences regarding the defense and security of the state at sea, namely with the emergence of threats and disturbances that affect the concept and strategy of national defense.

To enhance Indonesia's defense and military strength, especially the Navy, in order to deal with the phenomenon of arms races in the Southeast Asia region and the threats and disturbances that arise as risks from Indonesia's strategic geographical constellation, the Indonesian Government must have a feasible, acceptable, and suitable strategy. The following is the formulation of the problem designed by the researcher to answer the two problems.

1. How is the classification of the arms race phenomenon in the Southeast Asia region?
2. What are the methods of developing the Indonesian defense and military, especially the Indonesian Navy, to deal with the phenomenon of arms races in the Southeast Asia region and threats and disturbances as risks from Indonesia's geographic constellation?

Methods

A. Research Type

This research is descriptive qualitative, where the researcher tries to understand social reality, by seeing the conditions according to what happened, not in the conditions that should be. Qualitative research always begins with unclear problems which then change and develop into clarity along with the research process. In addition, qualitative research also aims to understand phenomena in a natural social context by prioritizing the process of deep communication interaction between researchers and the phenomena being studied. In the qualitative approach, researchers have consistent involvement in asking (what, why, how), listening, recording, observing, engaging, living, thinking and taking inferences from objects in the field, where this role can be called the main instrument (Nasution, 2003).

B. Act of the Republic of Indonesia Number 34 of 2004 concerning the Indonesian Armed Forces

The Indonesian Armed Forces (Tentara Nasional Indonesia/TNI) is a main defense instrument of the Republic of Indonesia which is mandated to carry out state defense policies

in order to uphold state sovereignty, maintaining territorial integrity, protecting the safety of the nation, conducting either Military Operations for War (MOW) as well as Military Operations Other than War (MOOW), and actively participate in regional and international peacekeeping operations. In article 6, it is explained that the TNI has functions, which are:

1. Preventing all form of military and armed threat from outside and within the country against the sovereignty, territorial integrity and safety of the nation;
2. Taking actions against every form of threat; and
3. Restoration of state security conditions that have been disturbed due to security disturbances.

Then in Article 7, it is explained the main task of TNI, as follows:

1. Military operation for war (MOW)
2. Military operations other than war (MOOW) consisting of:
 - 1) Coping with armed separatism movements;
 - 2) Coping with the rebellion;
 - 3) Coping with acts of terrorism;
 - 4) Securing the border area;
 - 5) Securing the national vital object that is strategic;
 - 6) Conducting peace keeping task in accordance with foreign policy;
 - 7) Securing the President and Vice President and his family;
 - 8) Empowering the territory defense assets and the proponent in accordance with the universe defense system doctrine;
 - 9) Assisting the task of local administrative
 - 10) Assisting the National Police of the Republic of Indonesia in the context of security and public order in accordance with regulation;
 - 11) Assisting to secure the head and representatives of foreign countries who are visiting Indonesia;
 - 12) Assisting to tackle natural disasters, refugee camps and humanitarian issue;
 - 13) Assisting in Search and Rescue (SAR) operations; and
 - 14) Assisting the government in maintaining the security of shipping and flight from hijacking, piracy and smuggling.

Specifically, the Indonesian Navy (TNI Angkatan Laut) is an integral part of the TNI which acts as the main component of Indonesian defense in maritime aspect to carry out its duties based on state policies and political decisions in order to preserve the sovereignty of the state, maintain the integrity of the Indonesian territory based on *Pancasila* and the 1945 Constitution and protect the nation and all Indonesian citizens from threats and disruption to the integrity of the nation and the state through the implementation of Military Operations for War and Military Operations Other than War (Marsetio, 2013). Comprehensively, Article 9 has explained the duties of Indonesian Navy, which are:

1. Conducting Indonesian Navy roles in defence sector;
2. Enforcing the law and maintaining of national jurisdiction in accordance with the provisions of national law and ratified international law;
3. Conducting naval diplomacy in order to support foreign policy stipulated by the government;
4. Conducting TNI's responsibilities in building and developing naval area; and
5. Conducting the empowerment in the area of maritime defence.

B. Arms Races

Michael D. Wallace and Charles A. Mecois (1995) argue that the situation and conditions that occur in the Southeast Asian region can be declared an arms race (Arms Races) if it has fulfilled 4 (four) basic elements, which are:

1. Building military force as a reaction or anticipating the same development by the military competitor;
2. Mutualistic military force development;
3. The growth rate of military power is reciprocal, spectacular and has a rapid level of acceleration; and
4. Achieve priorities or advantages to military rivals or vice versa to prevent rivals from doing so.

Then Michael D. Wallace and Charles A. Mecois (1995) explained that there were 7 (seven) fundamental things that were background concerns about Arms Races in the region, Yaitukemudian Michael D. Wallace and Charles A. Mecois (1995) explained that there were 7 (seven) fundamental things that were background concerns about Arms Races in the region, such as:

1. History of eternal competition among the military in the region;
2. Significant territorial disputes that have caused armed hostility or military confrontation;
3. Engagement of 2 (two) or more military power from within or outside the area;
4. Major military equipment acquisitions as a reaction to threats due to disputes;
5. The domestic elite is militated in several countries in the Asia Pacific region, so the military has the dominant influence in setting political and budget priorities;
6. The pattern of military acquisition in the region focuses on increasing offensive capabilities rather than defensive; and
7. Perception emerges that the acquisition of weapons is influenced by the momentum of technology which means military competition requires the acquisition of the most modern equipment.

While Colin S. Gray (1971) explained that the arms race could occur if it meets 4 (four) factors, which are:

1. There are 2 (two) or more parties who are consciously in mutual hostile relationships;
2. Carry out the structure of military forces with the aim of obtaining the effectiveness of combat capabilities or giving a trapping effect (deterrence effect) to the opposing party;
3. There are competition in the quantity of personnel and weapons and / or quality of personnel, weapons, organizations, doctrine and deployment of troops; and
4. Quick increase in quantity and quality.

Then Grant Hammond (1993) explained in detail that Arms Races occurred because of several factors, such as a bilateral relationship mainly; Each party specifically assumes the other as an enemy; The existence of public hostility and high antagonism between 2 (two) parties; Military / Political Planning for each party is intended directly or based on the ability and intention of other parties; extraordinary and consistent increase in shopping and acquisition of weaponry; and the intention of finding dominance over rivals through intimidation efforts.

C. Defense Planning

At the broadest level, the initial stage for defense planning methodologies may use demand- or supply-based defense planning, but the majority of defense planning activities tend to be demand-based. Because of the capability and capacity strategy are based on the notion of potential future engagement requirements. These demands can come from threats (threats) or capabilities (capability) desired or both. But in the end, a comprehensive strength structure which can meet the demands of the strategy and operating environment. Each defense planning approach has its advantages and disadvantages. Then in practice, the defense planning approach should take elements of both a demand-based and resource-focused approach and include a discussion of threats and capabilities. The initial development of the strategy requires a focus on the desired results, so implementation must be based on the realism of capabilities and the nature of existing strengths as well as feasibility and reach. If there is a gap between top-down and bottom-up results, at least theoretically and some notion of risk should be consciously accepted. The challenge for successful defense planning is the assessment of capabilities, capacities and risks using a mixed planning approach.

Threat based planning comes from potential enemies or conflicts that exist in the future. This plan has specifically determined who the enemy will be facing or the conflict that will occur in the future, so this plan is used to develop strength structure and posture plan in order to deal with the opponent. This planning method is very well used when a potential threat or enemy has been determined by a country, so that it can identify and analyze the biggest threat or ability of the opponent to be faced.

In one hand, threat-based planning has several advantages so that it can be considered that this planning can have a positive effect on defense planning, such as:

1. Focus on enemy capabilities strictly and detail;
2. Has a good success rate, because it is able to assess the enemy's military capabilities as a whole by comparing the level of vulnerability in certain areas during a certain conflict and for a certain period; and
3. Focus on equipment and capabilities in critical areas where potential conflict arises, thereby reducing costs.

On the other hand, threat-based planning has limitations and risks because it will face several things that are categorized as losses, namely Michael J. Mazarr, et al (2019):

1. Requires the ability to detail the capabilities and intentions of current and future adversaries which always creates ambiguity due to uncertainty;
2. This plan is built with the concept of being reactive to the need to build strength based on the enemy's capabilities and information about the enemy at this time, so that it will create opportunities for potential threats from other parties;
3. Emphasize only one conflict or one specific threat; and
4. Tend to focus on emergency operations, especially when entering the war phase, but at the expense of peacetime and post-conflict needs.

A defense plan should understand the capabilities and capacities of all phases that exist in a conflict, so that it can anticipate all potentials that will occur both before the conflict and after the conflict ends. However, there are alternatives that can be a solution to the shortcomings of threat-based planning, which is capabilities-based planning which aims to analyze the capabilities needed to face wars in the future without knowing who the opponent will be. So this plan prepares military forces to deal with something general.

The following are the advantages that it can be considered by a country to implement capabilities-based planning in order to develop its military capabilities, such as:

1. Does not require an agreement regarding who the enemy will face, so there is no need to specifically know and identify capabilities;
2. Potentially reduces the risk of focusing too narrowly, because the threats that occur shift to general ones;
3. Have a broader perspective in viewing conditions in the future; and
4. Capable to identify capacity gaps that can be difficult to cognize when a country is only considering a conflict scenario

However, as a method, capability-based planning also has the disadvantages, as follow:

1. Unable to understand the type of capability of the threat we will face;
2. Unable to prepare operational plans quickly, including time, operational concepts and strength postures because they do not focus on a particular conflict; and
3. It will indirectly eliminate political problems from the planning process, so that it will rule out several area, including the risk of increasing escalation and reactions from other countries to certain conflicts.

D. Minimum Essentials Forces

Minimum Essential Forces (MEF) is a national development mandate in the field of defense and security which has been stipulated in the Presidential Regulation of the Republic of Indonesia Number 5 of 2010 concerning the 2010-2014 National Medium Range Development Plan (RPJMN). In 2009, the President of the Republic of Indonesia, Susilo Bambang Yudhoyono, initiated the MEF policy through the Strategic Defense Review (SDR), which included several aspects, such as weapons, human resources, bases and training grounds for troops, the Defense Industry, organization and budget. MEF is a strategy of building the main component strengths towards the ideal as a form of principal strength that meets certain standards and has a deterrence effect. The development of the MEF has been aligned with limited resources by revitalizing the Defense Industry, but it is hoped that it will still be able to address actual threats as a priority scale without ignoring potential threats that arise when the TNI carries out Military Operations for War (MOW) and Military Operations Other Than War (MOOW) Attachment to the Act of the Minister of Defense of the Republic of Indonesia Number 19 of 2012 concerning the Minimum Essential Force Alignment Policy of the Main Components, 2012).

In order to increase the strength of the main components through the MEF policy, the Government of Indonesia uses 3 (three) main components in the MEF preparation process, which are:

1. **Capability-based planning** is a method to enhance the military capacity in order to achieve a certain level of strength needed to be able to carry out tasks by considering the ability of the state budget and own assets.
2. **Threat-based planning** is a method to enhance the military capacity based on a predictive approach to the threats faced and the calculation of power requirements by considering the enemy's strength to be faced.
3. **Flash point-based planning** a method to enhance the military capacity based on the classification of Indonesia territory which is identified as an area that has a high potential for the occurrence of various actual threats as a priority basis for the development of the composition and disposition of the MEF gradually and continuously.

Furthermore, the MEF Policy will be implemented in stages and implemented through 4 (four) MEF development strategies, which are:

1. **Re-materialization** is the fulfillment of Organizational Table and Equipment and Personnel and Equipment into 100%.
2. **Revitalization** is the enhancement of unit stratification and material levels which is adjusted to the development of threats.
3. **Relocation** is the transfer of units/personnel/materials from one area to the projected flash point area.
4. **Procurement** is the construction of a new unit along with its personnel and defense equipment in order to achieve MEF's Main Components establishment.

Based on the Quick Summary Analysis conducted by the Budget Study Center of the Secretariat General of the House of Representatives 2020 about the Indonesian Defense Budget; Fulfillment of the Minimum Essential Force, reported that there has been an increase in achieving MEF program but has not yet met the target. It stated that the achievement of MEF I (2010-2014) and MEF II (2015-2019) is still below the set of target. Based on the data obtained, it is acknowledged that in October 2019, the realization of the MEF only reached 63.19 percent of the MEF phase II target which should have reached the target of 75.54 percent (Ervita and Arjun, 2020).

Result and Discussion

A. Classification of the phenomenon of arms races in the Southeast Asia region

The General Secretary of the United Nations explained in a report on the international law of the sea in 2008, that there are 7 (seven) types of maritime threats, namely (Muhammad Ridho and Arfin Sudirman, 2020):

1. Terrorist acts against shipping, installations at sea and other maritime interests;
2. Piracy and armed piracy against ships;
3. Illegal fishing;
4. Pollution of the marine environment;
5. People smuggling by sea;
6. Smuggling of narcotics and psychotropic substances; and
7. Smuggling of weapons and weapons of mass destruction.

Based on these types of maritime threats, countries in the Southeast Asian region still view that maritime security is in a traditional perspective and tends to be state centric, which is a prioritizing an approach through military force. This condition is the same as the concept of sea power which described by Alfred Thayer Mahan, where a country will focus on naval warfare as the frontline in securing maritime areas and trade routes significantly (Khoo K. Giok, 2015). The development of the capability and capacity of the navy is the main factor to achieve the national interest. Although not the only instrument in the national interest, military power still plays an important role in strengthening a nation. Based on these conditions, countries in the Southeast Asia region continue to increase their national defense budgets to continue to build their respective naval forces in order to face the threats, challenges, obstacles and disturbances that exist in the Southeast Asian region.

The researcher analyzes that increasing the capability of naval forces in the Southeast Asian region is a reaction from a country to the development of national, regional and global strategic environmental conditions, causing a security dilemma. This condition is the most realistic choice to be taken by a country because each country has a national interest in the security of its country, so that increasing military capabilities is carried out in order to build a balance of military power in their country. However, there is a big risk that must be

faced, the worst possibility of increasing military capabilities among Southeast Asian countries, which is the security spiral. The condition that occurs is that there are 2 (two) countries that will be involved in arms races, each of which responds to an increase in weapons procurement and defense spending in the context of arming themselves, thus causing military conflicts and wars in the long term.




Figure 1. The defense budgets of Southeast Asian countries
Source: The Military Balance 2010-2019

The increase in the defense budget each year is a strong indicator that countries in the Southeast Asia region have a strong desire to continue to improve their military capabilities. In addition, several countries in the Southeast Asian region have carried out a gradual increase in the acquisition and modernization of their military forces in the last 10 (ten) years. Singapore and Malaysia have implemented a program to modernize their military forces, both land, sea and air forces. Singapore acquired formidable class frigates, Archer class submarines and independently built Littoral Mission Vessels (LMV) class warships. Meanwhile, Malaysia acquired the Agusta and Scorpene class submarines. Then Vietnam has acquired 6 (six) Kilo-class submarines from Russia and 6 (six) Gepard-class frigates. Developments in the Southeast Asia region can be interpreted as a trend that slightly disturbs the regional security calculus. Although the increase is not significant, this positive development can be an explanation that countries in the Southeast Asia region, such as Indonesia, Singapore, Malaysia, Thailand, Vietnam and the Philippines are still thinking of continuing to improve their military capabilities, so the researcher analyzes that there are indications of an arms race in the Southeast Asia region which is wrapped in the military power modernization program.




Figure 1.3. Frigate Type Ships in Southeast Asia
Source: The Military Balance 2010-2020

Based on the development of the regional situation and conditions in Southeast Asia, the researcher comprehensively analyzes the theories and opinions related to arms races in order to understand in depth the phenomena that have developed and continue in real terms through valid statistical data. The phenomenon of increasing defense budgets of countries in the Southeast Asian region and the increasing acquisition of defense equipment in order to increase the capability of military forces has led to differences of opinion, where Barry Buzan and Herring (1998) and Richard Bitzinger (2010) have the opinion that the phenomenon that occurs in the Southeast Asian region is a the result of arms dynamics and the maintenance of a balance of military power in the status quo. Furthermore, Collins S. Gray (1971) and Grant Hammond (1993) argue that if the factors that have become conditions for the occurrence of arms races are not met, then a condition cannot be called an arms race, one of which is not there is evidence of the existence of conflicting or hostile countries in the Southeast Asian region or there is no evidence that there is competition in the quantity of personnel and weapons and/or the quality of personnel, weapons, organization, doctrine and deployment of troops; and rapid improvement in quantity and quality.

Meanwhile, Michael D. Wallace and Charles A. Mechois (1955) state the opposite, where the presence of hostile countries in the region does not become a factor in determining the occurrence of arms races, but presents a historical factor that explains the eternal competition between the military in area; significant territorial disputes and lead to armed hostilities or military confrontations. So the researcher analyzes that the phenomenon in the Southeast Asia region is an indication that there is a potential for arms races because it is proven that in the Southeast Asia region there is a history of disputes between several countries as well as significant territorial disputes and causing armed hostilities or military confrontations. Differences of opinion that occurred among several analysts have presented a space that places arms races in the Southeast Asia region like the wind, where when researchers see with the naked eye, the presence of arms races is not visible. Because the situation and conditions that

are developing are that each country has the desire to increase its military capabilities as a form of maintaining the status quo, arms dynamic or at a higher level is a security dilemma. However, when researchers feel the turmoil of changes in the amount of military budgets and patterns of defense equipment acquisition carried out by several countries in the Southeast Asia region, the researchers feel that these conditions are more likely towards arms races, but are not visible to the naked eye because they are wrapped in the form of modernization of military equipment. Based on these situations and conditions, the researchers have formulated 8 (eight) factors that become indicators of the classification and definition of arms races in the Southeast Asia region, which are:

1. A deep hostility that usually involves not only the military, but also the community;
2. Strengthening of military power aimed at influencing the political and military aspects of competing countries. This condition can be considered as an indication of a stake in policies and strategies at the top level, but its implementation is specific to the operational aspect;
3. In general, it involves two countries/two parties bilaterally. However, it can also involve two or more major military forces from within or outside the region;
4. There is competition for weapons ownership in quantity and quality in order to anticipate the same development by competitors (there is a desire to dominate rivals through military superiority);
5. Increasing the number of weapons possessions very quickly or intensely which sometimes at a certain level is in abnormal growth;
6. The pattern of weapons acquisition in the region that focuses on increasing offensive rather than defensive capabilities;
7. There is a perception that weapons acquisition is influenced by technological momentum, which means that military competitions/arms races tend to be conducted in the most modern way weapons acquisitions; and
8. Militarized domestic elites in some countries where the military has dominant influence in setting political and budgetary priorities.

Table 1. Classification of Arms Races Definitions/Requirements

No.	Tabulation	Classification
1.	There is a deep hostility that usually involving not only the military, but also the people.	1. <u>VERY HIGH</u> Level Arms Races 81% -100% = 7 to 8 Definition/Requirements Fulfilled
2.	There is a strengthening of military power which aimed to influencing the political and military aspects of competing countries. This condition can be considered as an indication of a stake in policies and strategies at the top level, but its implementation is specific to the operational aspect.	2. <u>HIGH</u> Level Arms Races 61% - 80% = 5 s.d 6 Definition/Requirements Fulfilled
3.	In general, it involves two countries/two parties bilaterally. However, it can also involve two or more major military forces from within or outside the region.	3. <u>MODERATE</u> Level Arms Races 41%-60% = 3 to 4

4.	There is a competition for weapons acquisition in quantity and quality in order to anticipate the same development by competitors (there is a desire to dominate rivals through military superiority)	Definition/Requirements Fulfilled
5.	Increasing the number of weapons acquirement in very quickly or intensely which sometimes at a certain level is at an abnormal growth.	4. <u>LOW</u> Level Arms Races 21%-40% = 2 Definition/Requirements Fulfilled
6.	A pattern of weapons acquisition in the region that focuses on increasing offensive rather than defensive capabilities	
7.	There is a perception that weapons acquisition are influenced by technological momentum, which means that military competitions/arms races tend to be conducted in the most modern way weapons acquisitions are.	<u>VERY LOW</u> Level Arms Races 1%-20%= 0 to 1 Definition/Requirements Fulfilled
8.	Domestic elites are militarized in some countries where the military has dominant influence in setting political and budgetary priorities.	

Source: Researcher's analysis based on tabulation of arms races theory, 2021

Researchers use these 8 (eight) classification indicators to determine the current level of arms races, ranging from very low, low, moderate, high and very high. So that it can be analyzed more deeply to what extent countries in the Southeast Asia region know and feel the presence of arms races as a phenomenon that causes turmoil in regional security stability. The researcher analyzes that after the arms races can be classified, the Indonesian government can use the data as a reference to consider the direction of development and development of Indonesia's military forces, especially the Indonesian Navy, faced with Indonesia's status as an archipelagic country which has a marine area of two-thirds of the total area of the sea. the total area of Indonesia and the number of threats and disturbances that come and are present by sea as the mouthpiece of the approach.

B. Methods of building defense and the Indonesian military, especially the Indonesian Navy, to deal with the phenomenon of arms races in the Southeast Asia region and threats and disturbances as risks from the geographical constellation of Indonesia

The development of situations and conditions at the national and regional levels in the last 10 years has been marked by the emergence of the arms race phenomenon that occurred in the Southeast Asia region. This has given rise to many opinions and explanations which increasingly show that modern arms races no longer look like the arms races that occurred during the World War I, II and Cold War eras. The researcher analyzes that the current arms races are more likely to be covered in the process of modernizing military equipment and defense equipment, so that it is only seen as a condition where a country maintains the status quo or is more likely to be part of the arms dynamic. This cannot be denied, because the fact that several countries in the Southeast Asian region have increased their military budgets and

acquired advanced defense equipment with advanced technology and strong hitting power, such as frigate warships and submarines.

Indonesia is one of the countries which has a positive record in terms of increasing military strength and capability. Based on data from Global Fire Power (2020), Indonesia's military strength is ranked 16th out of 137 countries with an index of 0.2804. This condition makes Indonesia as a country that has better military strength compared to other countries in the Southeast Asian region. However, this situation is inversely proportional to the condition of the Indonesian Navy. It due to the Indonesian Navy assets are only in the average rank of 35 to d. 50 in the world, except for the Corvette and the Frigate which managed to rank in the top 5 in the world.

Indonesia is an archipelagic country which has a sea area of two-thirds of the total area of the country. Then this condition is supported by the geographical constellation of Indonesia which is very strategic, thus positioning Indonesia as a strategic sea lane for international shipping traffic which is prone to maritime threats, such as threats to safety of navigation at sea and illegal activities, both of which have the potential for loss of natural resources up to smuggling of prohibited goods and human trafficking. In addition, Indonesia's geographical location is at the confluence of 3 (three) active earth plates, causing Indonesia to become part of the world's ring of fire trajectory which is prone to natural disasters and impacts social life. Based on the situation and conditions that developed both from geography, natural resources, economy and politics have influenced the stability of Indonesia's national defense and security. Therefore, the Government of Indonesia is imperatively needed to increase the capability and strength of the Indonesian military, especially the Indonesian Navy, in order to protect the territorial sea and Indonesia's national jurisdiction from existing threats and disturbances.

In accordance with to policy of aligning the main components of the Minimum Essential Forces in the Appendix to the Regulation of the Minister of Defense of the Republic of Indonesia Number 19 of 2012, the Government of Indonesia has implemented capability-based planning, threat-based planning and flash points-based planning as the main components of the MEF. The Indonesian government has used the MEF as a strategy to increase the capability and strength of the Indonesian military since 2010 until now. However, based on the data obtained from the update on the achievements of assets aspect of MEF in the Quick Summary Analysis conducted by the Budget Study Center of the Secretariat General of the DPR RI in 2020, stated that the MEF achievements of stage I (2010-2014) and MEF II (2015-2014). 2019) is still below the set target. So that there are still some sectors that have not experienced optimal improvement and strengthening, both in terms of quality and quantity. The researcher analyzes that the Government of Indonesia still needs additional components to be used as a synchronization of the three main components that are currently being used. Based on the Defense Planning theory that has been explained by Michael J. Mazarr et al (2019) in The U.S, The Department of Defense's Planning Process: Components and Challenges recognizes that a defense planning approach should take elements of both a demand-based and resource-focused approach and include a discussion of threats and capabilities. Because in the end, a comprehensive strength structure is a strength structure that can meet the demands of the strategy and operating environment.

Defense planning theory has introduced the capability-based planning and threat-based planning approaches, both of which have been implemented by several countries in the world, including Indonesia. The Government of Indonesia has implemented the two approaches combined with flash points, so that there are 3 (three) main components in the preparation of the MEF. The government added a flash point because it considers areas that have a high

potential for the occurrence of various actual threats as a priority basis for developing the composition and disposition of the MEF in a gradual and sustainable manner. The combination of capability-based planning, threat-based planning and flash point-based planning methods is very realistic in compiling Indonesian military forces, especially the Navy, because it is in accordance with the Minimum Essential Forces concept which focuses on meeting the needs of national defense which is faced with a limited state defense budget. MEF is a strategy of building strength as the main component towards the ideal, but it is not directed as a strategy of building strength to win the war in total. MEF is a strategy used to establish basic strengths that meet certain standards and have a deterrence effect.

However, researchers analyzed the existing conditions according to data and facts, there are still shortcomings in the implementation of the MEF in order to increase the capabilities and strength of the Indonesian military, especially the Navy. Because when faced with the need for strength and ideal posture, the development of the Navy's strength should still consider the concept of the operation being carried out. However, if the Indonesian government does not consider this, the researcher analyzes that the strength of the TNI, especially the Navy, has not been able to optimally deal with threats that are military and non-military in nature, such as the effects and consequences of the arms race phenomenon that occurs in the Southeast Asia region, illegal fishing, illegal logging, human trafficking which have become transnational crimes. Therefore, the researcher offers 1 (one) new component, namely the "Naval Concept of Operations t", to complement the existing MEF components in order to speed up the improvement of Indonesian Navy strength. Moreover, implementation of Navy Concept of Operations as a new component, then, the direction of the development of the Indonesian Navy's strength and posture can be more focused. It is because the planning will also determine factors including Area of Maritime Operations (AMO), categorization of AMO and operating approaches in AMO. Therefore, it is expected to drive Indonesian Navy into a professional and modern with regional projection capabilities and global commitment.

Conclusion

Based on the results of the research and analysis carried out by the researcher, the following conclusions are drawn:

1. Arms races have become a phenomenon that can disrupt defense and security stability in the Southeast Asia region which can be classified into several levels, namely very low, low, moderate, high and very high, based on 8 (eight) factors formulated by researchers as indicators classification and definition of arms races.
2. Minimum Essential Forces (MEF) is a national development mandate in the field of defense and security as well as a strategy used by the Government of Indonesia to increase the capability and strength of the TNI, which is compiled based on 3 (three) main components, namely capability-based planning, threat-based planning and flash points-based planning.
3. The Naval Concept of Operations can be used as an additional component that harmonizes the 3 (three) main components that make up the MEF in order to generate a professional and modern Indonesian Navy which has regional projection capabilities and able to fulfill Indonesian global commitment policy.

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