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MINUSCA on its mandate

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Abstract. Since independence from France in 1960, the Central African Republic (CAR) has never been free from conflict. Almost every turn of CAR leader begins with a coup d'état. Resistance from the Seleka and Anti-Balaka rebel groups emerged and exacerbated the situation in CAR. The conflict that was originally an opposition-government conflict developed into a religious conflict. So the question arises regarding the efforts and involvement of third parties in maintaining peace in the CAR. The UN Security Council permits the spread of UN peacekeeping operations through The UN Multidimensional Integrated Stabilization in the Central African Republic (MINUSCA) on 10 April 2014 by protecting civilians as a top priority. The focus of this article is to analyze MINUSCA in carrying out its mandate in CAR. This article is analyzed with role theory and conflict theory. The data used in analyzing this article is secondary data. The data is obtained from books, scientific journals, dissertations or theses, official documents, and the internet. The results in this article find that the role played by MINUSCA in the CAR Conflict is as a peace facilitator. While carrying out their duties, MINUSCA plays a role in the protection of CAR civilians and the development of troop personnel in order to increase the effectiveness of missions in the CAR in order to create a peaceful and safe environment.

Keywords. Central African Republic, MINUSCA, Conflict, Peacekeeping

1. Introduction

Central African Republic (CAR) is a republic country which was independent from the French occupation in 1960 (Maastricht Graduate School of Governance, 2017). However, it can be said that the people are not fully independent yet because of military coups, political instability and rebellions that are still rife in the country. Various conflicts such as ethnic, racial, and religious conflicts make many human rights violations occur between certain groups. The conflict that occurred in CAR was initially a political conflict that widened into ethnic conflict. Previously this country was very little reported in the international world, but since the end of 2012, news about CAR was widely reported in international media because of the outbreak of armed conflict by the Seleka separatist group (Rozi Rastafani, 2015).

CAR fell into chaos in 2012 after a Muslim-dominated opposition coalition, toppled President Francois Bozize's government. The success of Seleka itself cannot be separated from the weak motivation and equipment of war owned by the Central African military. The situation was caused by the policies of the Bozize regime which weakened its military, this was based on Bozize's concern over the military history of the CAR which always staged a coup against the President (Rozi Rastafani, 2015). However, the opposition was overthrown by a Christian opposition known as Anti-Balaka which later filled the power vacuum. The transition of power

became the beginning of the dire consequences for the Muslims of the period that followed (P.B.S, 2015).

Conflict and political instability that continues to plague CAR has become a concern of the international community especially the United Nations (UN), the UN Security Council (UNSC) and the African Union. This awareness makes the desire of the world community to strive for peace, resolution of conflicts and rebuild cooperation that can reduce conflict in CAR. The UN Security Council meeting to discuss conflicts in CAR has been held since 1997, with the main objective of taking joint steps to efficiently address the problems that occur in CAR. The UN Security Council which has the primary responsibility for maintaining international peace and security, especially in determining the threat to peace, the destruction of peace or acts of aggression must be able to determine the mandate for the UN Peacekeeping Force Operations based on a comprehensive approach. That is why it is necessary to consider the formation of one or several regional centers, which prepare regional peacekeeping forces to anticipate possible conflicts in Africa (Adnan, 2008).

On December 5, 2013, UNSC Resolution 2127 (2013) authorized the spread of the African-led International Support Mission to the Central African Republic, known as the MISCA, which received full support from the United Nations to stabilize the conflict in CAR. The peacekeeping mission led by the African Union in December 2013 was not renewed after a year of operation. This is due to experiencing several obstacles such as the limitations of logistical support systems, lack of vehicles and lack of communication equipment structures. In May 2014, the United Nations and the African Union paid a joint visit to CAR to assess the capacity of the MISCA contingent and identify capability gaps. As a follow up to the problems that have occurred, the department of peacekeeping operations and field support has worked closely with MISCA forces and the police who have also contributed to their transfer to the United Nations Multidimensional Integrated Stabilization Mission in the Central African Republic (MINUSCA) (UN Security Council, 2014).

After it was decided through UNSC resolution 2149 (2014) related to the transfer of MISCA's authority to MINUSCA, this peacekeeping mission was equipped with better military and logistical resources to carry out its mandate. Although facing many challenges in carrying out its mandate since 2014, MINUSCA has undoubtedly helped protect civilians in CAR and expanded state authority as two important tasks of its mandate. Since then, the UNSC has continued to renew the MINUSCA mandate until 15 September 2020 because MINUSCA has demonstrated effectiveness in carrying out its mandate.

Based on the explanation above, conflicts that occur in CAR are conflicts that are triggered by government opposition groups, where these groups are not satisfied with the performance of CAR government which makes its people feel there must be a change in the country. The Security Council must carry out its main duties and functions in dealing with the instability of CAR. Therefore, MINUSCA stands as a response to the escalation of high-level conflicts that occur in CAR which has an impact on the instability of CAR. In this article, there are several issues discussed. First, the focus of the discussion is how MINUSCA carries out its mandate in CAR. Then this article also discusses the conflicts that occur in CAR and the challenges facing MINUSCA. In this case, the authors found a correlation between MINUSCA in carrying out its mandate and its influence on CAR.

2. Theoretical Framework

2.1 Role Theory

Role Theory is used in this article to explain the extent to which MINUSCA plays a role in carrying out its mandate in CAR. The role is a dynamic aspect. If a person performs their rights and obligations in accordance with their position then they perform a role. The role also means part of the main task that must be carried out. In terms of organizational behavior, this role is one component of the organization's social system, in addition to the norms and culture of the organization. Here in general the 'role' can be defined as "expectations about appropriate behavior in a job position (leader, subordinate)". There are two types of behavior expected in a job, namely role perception and role expectation. Role perception is a person's perception of the way that person is expected to behave; or in other words, is an understanding or awareness of the pattern of behavior or function expected of that person; and role expectation, which is the way other people accept someone's behavior in certain situations. With the role a person plays in the organization, an important component will be formed in terms of the person's identity and ability to work. In this case, an organization must ensure that these roles are clearly defined. Scott et al. (1981) mentions that there are five important aspects of the role, namely (Syahfri, 2018):

1. The role is impersonal: the position of the role itself will determine its expectations, not the individuals.
2. The role is related to work behavior - that is, expected behavior in a particular job.
3. The role is difficult to control - (role clarity and role ambiguity)
4. The role can be learned quickly and can produce several major behavioral changes.
5. Roles and jobs are not the same - someone who does one job can play several roles.

The role referred to in this paper is the role of MINUSCA in carrying out its mandate in accordance with UNSC Resolution 2149 (2014) and acting under CHAPTER VII of the UN charter that MINUSCA has authority in territorial security and protection of civilians in CARs.

2.2 Conflict Theory

The Conflict Theory referred to in this article refers to Michael E. Brown's theoretical framework which explains that the conflict caused by two interrelated factors. These factors are Underlying Causes and Proximate Causes. Underlying Causes have been the main factors that have existed since the beginning that have influenced the occurrence of conflict. Whereas Proximate Causes are conflict trigger factors that affect pre-existing conditions (Rozi Rastafari, 2015). The main causes are conditions or situations that make a region have a great potential to ignite conflict. Brown categorizes these main causes in three factors, namely structural factors which include weak state conditions, interstate security concerns and ethnic geography (Syamsul Hadi, 2007). The mechanism of this theory is that when these two factors meet, ethnic conflicts will result.

3. Research Methods

The research method used in this article is the qualitative descriptive research method to analyze MINUSCA on its mandate by linking the theory used in this article, namely the role theory and conflict theory with the phenomenon that occurs so that the conclusions obtained answer the problems discussed. Meanwhile, the data collection techniques in this article use literature study. Data collection in this research will be carried out with secondary data from literature studies, so that data sources will be obtained from books, journals, documents, reports, and other sources such as the internet, newspapers, or other relevant media as sources of information that are related with the title of this article, which is about MINUSCA on its mandate.

4. Result and Explanation

4.1 Conflict in the Central African Republic

Rich in natural resources but poor in governance, CAR is still struggling in poverty which is compounded by political segregation. The change of leadership at CAR has always been through a coup d'état since its independence from France in 1960. The problem of poverty in this country which is abundant in mineral resources is aggravated when Francois Bozize and his government have never made national development programs and good governance a priority. As head of state, Bozize only concentrated on enriching himself, his family and his tribe. In September 2006, rebel activity in the northwest and northeast increased, resulting in the government losing control.

Ethnic conflict carried out by ethnicity-based rebel groups is in line with the mechanism of the conflict theory from Michael E. Brown that classifies conflicts into underlying causes that meet with proximate causes so that ethnic conflicts occur. Overlapping political, structural, economic and cultural issues have caused this conflict to be so dynamic. This conflict that started on political issues spread to Muslim-Christian sectarian problems, where religious identity was used as a tool to mobilize mass support to continue the rebellion against government incompetence in accommodating pretensions and meeting the basic needs of the CAR community. Brown classified the causes of conflict in structural factors which included weak state conditions, security issues, and ethnic geography.

Referring to Michael E. Brown's conflict theory in structural factors, a weak state structure causes increased conflict intensity. CAR is then included in a country that is weak in its ability to guarantee the welfare of its people. Proven in the United Nations Human Development Index, CAR is ranked 188th out of 189 countries, which are still below the poverty line (UNDP, 2019). Then CAR is ranked 3rd out of 178 countries in the Fund for Peace Failed States Index which shows CAR as a failed state (Dani Belo, 2017).

The religious label is then used as a medium to mobilize and attract community support that is not in line with the performance of the CAR government in the welfare of its people and the government's weak response to community aspirations. This is compounded by the weak CAR government structure because CAR leaders mostly corrupt to enrich themselves, their families and tribes that can be seen during the reign of David Dacko to Francois Bozize. This is the main reason for the emergence of conflict and rebel groups until the coup so that the CAR state is considered to have failed in the welfare of the needs of the CAR community and failed in overcoming the country's internal problems.

Violations of Human Rights became the next result of the conflict. Civil society lost their families due to human trafficking, forced arrests, sexual violence and other violations. This problem then involved a number of actors involved in the conflict with the CAR government to make the country weak in overcoming the country's internal problems and human rights violations (Widianti, 2015):

No	Actor involved in conflict with the CAR government	
1.	Seleka	The armed groups that started the uprising in December 2012 were mostly Muslim but did not practice Islamic politics. The main purpose of forming an armed group was to overthrow Bozize. Seleka brutally robbed and killed civilians in Bangui.

2.	Anti-Balaka	It emerged from the violent response carried out by Seleka in March 2013. Anti-Balaka is an armed group whose members are mostly Christians. The group also has links to the Bozize regime and is based in the northern area of the capital of CAR.
3.	APRD (<i>Armée Populaire pour la restauration de la République et la démocratie</i>)	Rebel groups operating in the northwest region of the Central African Republic. The group was formed in 2006 after a coup that toppled President Ange-Felix Patasse. But in 2008 the APRD participated in the Inclusive Peace Dialogue and in early 2009 entered a coalition government with Bozizé and other civilian and military opposition groups.
4.	FDPC (<i>Front Démocratique Du Peuple Centrafricain</i>)	Anti-government militia in CAR. This group is one of the main fighters in the Central African Republic Bush War and became a member of the Seleka group which toppled the CAR government in 2013.
5.	CPJP (<i>Convention Des Patriotes Pour La Justice Et La Paix</i>)	As a rebel group in CAR involved in fighting in the Central African Republic Bush War which began in 2004. CPJP then joined the Seleka group to overthrow Francois Bozize in 2013.
6.	UFDR (<i>Union Des Forces Démocratiques Pour Le Rassemblement</i>)	Rebel groups fighting the government in the Central African Republic Bush War. CAR then accused UFDR of being supported by the Sudanese government. But on April 13, 2007, a peace agreement between the CAR government and the UFDR was signed in Birao. The agreement provided amnesty for the UFDR, its recognition as a political party, and finally integrated its members into the military.
7.	CPSK (<i>Convention Patriotique du salut du Kodro</i>)	The militia group in CAR which was established on 21 June 2012 is part of the Seleka group.
8.	UFR (<i>Union des Forces Républicaines</i>)	UFR was founded by Lt. Florian N'Djadder-Bedaya, a former member of the presidential guard under the leadership of Ange-Felix Patasse. After initially joining the APRD, then N 'Djadder-Bedaya established the UFR. The UFR was formed

		to denounce impunity and weak governance in the Bozize regime.
7.	A2R (<i>Alliance pour la Renaissance et la Refondation</i>)	Armed groups that deny being part of the Seleka alliance. A2R says that they only pursue the same goals as Seleka

Conflict between groups and ethnicities with the government that occurred in the Central African Republic began to subside when these groups signed a peace agreement with the government, namely The Comprehensive Peace Agreement which was signed in Libreville, Gabon on June 21, 2008. The main content of the agreement is the granting of amnesty to perpetrators of crimes against the state which occurred before 2008, calling for disarmament and the demobilization process to integrate former rebels into society and integrate these groups into one into the regular armed forces of the Central African Republic. APRD and UFDR signed an agreement on 21 June 2008, Mouvement des libéursurs Centrafricains pour la Justice (MLCJ) on 7 December 2008, UFR on 15 December 2008, FDPC on 3 July 2009. While CPJP finally on 25 August 2012, after a year negotiating with the Government, signing The Comprehensive Peace Agreement (Widianti, 2015).

The conflict heats up again when Francois Bozize won the presidential election again in January 2011 which is believed to be an indication of fraud in the election. This made the CAR security problem increasingly heated up, which then in 2012 precisely on December 10th, an offensive rebel movement emerged when the UFDR occupied Ndele, Ouadda and Sam Ouandja. The UFDR forces then joined three other movements, namely CPSK, CPJP, UFR. Other rebel groups also joined, such as the FDPC and A2R. These movements are organized and call themselves Séléka. The Seleka group arose because it was triggered by dissatisfaction with the performance of the government so they tried to stage a coup. Almost every turn of the country's leaders begins with a coup. One of them was during the reign of Francois Bozize. He was in power from 15 March 2003 to 24 March 2013. The anti-Bozize population in the north of CAR considers Bozize to fail to uphold democratic commitments, delay economic reforms and delay the promised political implementation. It was then that the rebel group took active resistance against the government (Widianti, 2015).

After Seleka succeeded in overthrowing Bozize, Michel Djotodia unilaterally declared himself President of the Central African Republic and concurrently as Minister of Defense. Djotodia ruled from March 24, 2013 to January 10, 2014. Seleka successfully disbanded during the reign of Djotodia. But after the fall of Bozize, the condition of CAR worsened because it was later discovered that the rebellion by Seleka was a Muslim group that had committed gross human rights violations, in this case CAR was dominated by Christianity. This is where the conflict develops and extends, where at first it was only an opposition-government conflict, then later it widened and turned to religious conflict. On that basis Christian groups eventually formed a resistance militia which called itself Anti-Balaka (Hardi Alunaza SD, 2018).

In 2016, after years of negotiations and peace agreements, the newly elected leader, Faustin-Archange Taouadera won the election. But this is still not a turning point expected by the international community, CAR is still experiencing violence and armed conflict in its territory. This conflict between armed groups triggered massive human rights violations, ranging from massacres, torture, looting to the destruction of villages that showed an escalation of conflict in the CAR. This conflict has directly affected approximately 2.7 million CAR people, which is more than half the CAR population. In January 2015, more than 400,000 refugees in Chad, Cameroon, the Democratic Republic of Congo and 400,000 were displaced within the country. Estimates of civilians killed between 2000 and 5000 people and 80% of the Muslim population

in Bangui, the capital of CAR, chose to leave the city and some have been killed (Barbelet, 2015).

4.2 The Role of MINUSCA in Carrying Out its Mandate

The crisis and the ongoing conflict in the CAR have caused sub-regional, regional, international and bilateral actors to make various efforts to maintain peace. But there is no mission that has succeeded in eliminating the political, economic and social instability of the country. Basically the conflict in the CAR between the rebel movement and the government, is inseparable from the political situation and ethnicity that occurs. Then the United Nations made the UN Security Council allow the spread of UN peacekeeping operations through MINUSCA on 10 April 2014 by protecting civilians as the top priority to replace the role of MISCA.

Establishment of MINUSCA based on Chapter VII of the UN charter. The UN Security Council allows MINUSCA to take all that is needed in carrying out its mandate, in accordance with its capabilities. The UN Security Council also decided that the transfer of authority from the AU-led International Support Mission of the Central African Republic (MISCA) to MINUSCA. MINUSCA will carry out the tasks mandated through the Civil component, while MISCA will continue to carry out its duties as mandated by resolution 2127 of the UN Security Council (Hardi Alunaza SD, 2018). Other initial tasks include support for the transition process, facilitating humanitarian assistance, promoting and protecting human rights to support justice and rule of law, the process of disarmament, demobilization, reintegration and repatriation (Peacekeeping, 2020).

Since UNSC resolution 2149 (2014) in which case, MINUSCA first stood and carried out its mission, the mandate of this assignment was then extended until 15 November 2020, increased and strengthened its forces from 10,000 military personnel and 1,800 police personnel to 11,650 military personnel and 2,080 personnel the police contained in UNSC resolution 2499 (2019). The additional strength of the MINUSCA peace mission personnel became a fundament of UN member states to add and send personnel to CAR. This proves that the security situation in CAR has continued to improve since the existence of MINUSCA. Major developments began in 2018, one of which was the civilization of victims of CAR civil society which continued throughout 2019 (IPI, 2019). Even though minor conflicts still occur, large-scale conflicts between armed groups have intensified.

In general, the extended mandate stated in resolution 2499 (2019) gives 5 priority mandates to MINUSCA. the five priority mandates and the role of MINUSCA in carrying out these mandates are:

1. Protection of civilians

Especially the most vulnerable, namely women and children from the threat of violence and sexual crimes committed by armed groups. One of the successes in carrying out this mandate is that MINUSCA personnel are always alert in deploying their team of personnel for conflict prevention. The team was deployed in the Batangafo area, Ouham Province and Alindao, Basse-Kotto Province, then on 30 June 2019 a team of personnel was also deployed to Bocaranga, Ouham-Pende Province, to increase protection when armed groups who had signed a peace agreement on 6 February 2019 were demobilized. Since the outbreak of the clashes in the city of Birao on September 14, 2019, MINUSCA has swiftly provided security for refugees and sought protection near its base to minimize civilian casualties. In carrying out this priority mandate, MINUSCA continues to expand personnel training in protecting civil society such as pre-deployment training using the integrated and developed protection of civilians module in missions (UNSC, 2019).

2. Good offices and support to the peace process, including the implementation of the Peace Agreement, elections, national reconciliation, social cohesion and transitional justice at national and local levels

MINUSCA during carrying out its mandate has helped to form 29 local peace and reconciliation committees throughout the city in CAR as well as various local peace agreements (Howard, 2019). One example is the signing of the Political Agreement for Peace and Reconciliation in the Central African Republic between the CAR government and armed groups on 6 February 2019 under the assistance of the African Initiative for Peace and Reconciliation. Previously, Faustin Archange, President of CAR, coordinated with CAR officials, including political parties and civil society to strengthen the spirit of nationalism and popular support for the peace process. After lengthy coordination and consultation, on 10 January 2019, all officials agreed to hold a direct dialogue in Khartoum between the CAR government and Firmin Ngrebada, chairman of 14 armed groups. For the record, the parties agreed to establish a follow-up mechanism aimed at overseeing the effectiveness of the agreement (UNSC, 2019).

3. 2020/2021 elections

It is important for MINUSCA to work closely with CAR government in maintaining the stability and security of the region leading to elections that will be held from January to April 2020. The government and its partners continue to emphasize that strong support by MINUSCA is very important during the electoral process, given the limited capacity of national partners and technical, logistical, operational, and security challenges. MINUSCA formed a division that was devoted to preparation for the 2020 general election in the CAR, namely the MINUSCA Electoral Assistance Division (EAD). EAD is working with an independent CAR that is also devoted to preparation for elections, namely The National Electoral Authority (NEA), which is formed by seven proposed members from political parties, civil society and transitional authorities. The EAD and NEA centers are at the MINUSCA head office which includes units such as information technology, logistics, citizenship education, sensitivity training, communication and external relations. Aside from being at the head office of MINUSCA, EAD is spread in cities in CAR, such as Bria, Bouar, Kanga Bando and several other cities (MINUSCA, 2020). This proves that the election preparations conducted by MINUSCA and its partners are very intensive for the creation of safe, peaceful and fair elections. The 2020 election is expected to make the political situation in the CAR stable and develop.

4. Facilitate the creation of a secure environment for the immediate, full, safe and unhindered delivery of humanitarian assistance

During MINUSCA carrying out its mandate, the humanitarian situation at CAR has shown several developments including an increase in the number of CAR civilians who have been repatriated to their home regions. One of them was shown in November 2019 by decreasing the number of people who needed humanitarian assistance, from 2.9 million to 2.6 million. This development is different from what happened in early 2019 before the peace agreement, humanitarian assistance increased from 2.5 million to 2,9 million people. As of September 1, 2020, 355,000 people have returned to their home regions, this shows an increase of 18 percent compared to 2018. MINUSCA is working with the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) in facilitating the return of 7,142 refugees who experienced a very significant increase, around 400 percent less than in 2018. But CAR remains one of the most dangerous countries for humanitarian workers as evidenced by three humanitarian workers who were killed in 2019 (UNSC, 2019). Although this challenge is quite difficult for humanitarian actors,

MINUSCA continues to facilitate the delivery of humanitarian assistance as one of the top priorities.

5. Protection of the United Nations

UN personnel involved in the MINUSCA mission continue to operate even under difficult conditions in dealing with threats related to armed conflict, high levels of crime and riots. MINUSCA continues to support national justice authorities in the investigation and prosecution of crimes committed against peacekeeping personnel. Between June 1 and October 1, 2019, 98 incidents involved peacekeeping personnel. The United Nations has always been the target of armed attacks, with seven personnel injured in an armed attack in 2019 (UNSC, 2019). The security and safety of UN personnel will remain a serious challenge that must be faced at all times by MINUSCA personnel.

In terms of the mandate carried out by MINUSCA, then role theory is used in this section. In role functions according to Scott et al. (1981), MINUSCA carries out its main mandate of protection of CAR civilians as part of peacekeeping operations, namely:

1. The role is impersonal.

The position of the role itself will determine its expectations, not the individuals. In this case through MINUSCA, the mission of peacekeeping is intended one of which is to develop a political dialogue strategy and peace agreement. So that the rebel groups in the CAR can participate in dialogue, then this is also to resolve the problems between the rebel groups and the government as a process of overcoming the escalation of conflict in the CAR area. The mandate carried out by MINUSCA does not affect individuals involved in peacekeeping missions at CAR, but is impersonal, namely the CAR government, civil society and the United Nations.

2. That role is related to work behavior, that is, expected behavior in a particular job.

In this case, the peacekeeping mission undertaken by MINUSCA must be in accordance with UNSC Resolution 2149 (2014) to the latest resolution, namely UNSC Resolution 2499 (2019). The involvement of MINUSCA in peacekeeping missions is carried out to maintain peace and not to carry out acts of aggression that make matters worse. In this case, MINUSCA is expected to behave in accordance with the United Nations Peacekeeping Operations Principles and Guidelines (United Nations, 2008), that is also stated in article 101 of the UN charter Chapter XV that securing the highest standards of efficiency, competence and integrity is the most important consideration in the duties of UN staff (p. 77). National, international staff and uniformed personnel from UN peacekeeping operations are the most valuable assets and must be managed carefully. Becoming a UN peacekeeper requires extraordinary professionalism, dedication and self-control, where most UN peacekeepers around the world have these qualities (p. 78).

3. The role is difficult to control - (role clarity and role ambiguity)

In this case, the role actor must understand whether the role is carried out in accordance with the responsibilities and conditions of the role of the actor in order to create clarity and is not ambiguous. The role of MINUSCA in peacekeeping missions in CAR cannot be controlled by parties who do not have the authority to regulate the role of MINUSCA. To fulfill the mandate given by the UNSC to MINUSCA, the role must be objective.

4. That role can be learned quickly and can produce several major behavioral changes.

All personnel involved in the MINUSCA peacekeeping mission must exemplify the highest standards and be responsible for their behavior and performance. Therefore

before they are assigned, there is important training and education to ensure that the behavior of personnel in accordance with the provisions in article 101 of the UN charter chapter XV that securing the highest standards of efficiency, competence and integrity is the most important consideration in the duties of UN staff. This will directly change the main behavior of personnel to be well formed according to the capacity desired by the mandate, namely the UNSC.

5. Roles and jobs are not the same, someone who does one job can play several roles. In addition to carrying out its main role in MINUSCA personnel in peacekeeping as a force, it can also directly act as a diplomat. Interaction conducted by personnel with local communities in CAR is one of the efforts to reduce conflicts by conducting dialogue. In addition, MINUSCA also recruits civilian personnel who can help military and police personnel carry out peacekeeping missions. These two things become one of the proofs that roles and work are not the same where someone who does one job can play several roles.

4.3 MINUSCA Challenge

During the past six years since 2014 when MINUSCA was first commissioned, there have been many significant changes that have taken place. The most visible development was the signing of the Political Agreement for Peace and Reconciliation in the Central African Republic which was one of the positive impacts on the security situation in CAR. However, the implementation of this agreement has not yet fully stabilized the countries of the regions in the CAR. CAR civil society still faces threats from armed groups who do not comply with the agreement (Security Council Report, 2020). This indicates the challenges faced by MINUSCA remain severe, including CAR insecurity which is still at a low level and violence between armed groups. The CAR government and its people hope that this agreement will improve the situation and restore peace and security to CAR.

This security instability is caused by the general election which will be held in January to April 2020, where several armed groups that have signed the agreement experience mistrust of the political process in the presidential and legislative elections. The logistical procurement process for voter registration materials which should have been prepared in October 2019 was also delayed due to lack of resources resulting in a shift in the calendar of election activities (UNSC, 2019). In this case, it is important for MINUSCA to continue to consolidate democracy and strong support to ensure political stability during elections and so on. Another serious challenge that must be faced by MINUSCA is control in the exploitation and sexual abuse that is commonly experienced by women and children.

Monitoring the implementation of the Political Agreement for Peace and Reconciliation in the Central African Republic and ensuring that elections are held transparently and fairly remains one of the important tasks of MINUSCA. In addition to facing this challenge, MINUSCA personnel can also become diplomats to conduct dialogue and negotiations with members of armed groups who are blocking the delivery of humanitarian assistance to civil society CAR. Personnel sometimes take refuge in the bush or take refuge in churches and mosques to send humanitarian assistance. Around 600,250 people were moved internally at CAR. State authority is still embryonic and economic activity is still very low. Repeated attacks on reinforcements carrying goods greatly affect imports of aid to areas in need. At present, commercial reinforcements must be secured by MINUSCA personnel on major highways and other secondary routes so that goods can arrive at their destination (United Nations, 2019).

5. Conclusion

Conflict between the CAR government and the group has changed to become complicated, which has to do with one of the triggering factors of the rebellion besides political, economic and social instability. Then, the conflict and political instability that continues to plague CAR has come to the attention of the international community, especially the United Nations (UN), the UN Security Council (UNSC) and the African Union. This awareness makes the need of the world community to strive for peace, resolve conflicts and rebuild cooperation that can reduce conflict in CAR. UNSC Resolution 2149 (2014) and implemented based on Chapter VII of the UN Charter was issued by the UNSC to assign MINUSCA to a peacekeeping mission at CAR.

MINUSCA with its main mandate of protection of civilians, maintaining peace and maintaining the implementation of the 2020/2021 general election shows significant progress on the stability of the CAR area, although not yet fully stable. One of them was the signing of the Political Agreement for Peace and Reconciliation in the Central African Republic on 6 February 2019 which had a positive impact on the security situation in CAR. MINUSCA still faces a number of challenges that must be faced, such as oversight of the implementation of the agreement and armed groups that still carry out violence against CAR civilians. However, MINUSCA is assisted and supported by the CAR government and its partners in carrying out its mandate. The presence of a strong MINUSCA is very important for the stability of CAR and plays a central role in peace in CAR. This is one reason MINUSCA's mandate has been extended every year from 2014 to the latest extension, November 15, 2020.

Beyond that, the conditions that underlie MINUSCA can carry out its mission that succeeded in reducing regional instability in CAR are the approval of the UN, the UNSC, and positive responses from the government and the CAR community, without this basis, no peacekeeping mission is successful. Then it is hoped that the CAR government and other partners can continue to fully support and strengthen transparent cooperation for peace and efforts to restore CAR together with MINUSCA as a peace facilitator. In addition, it is also hoped that more contributions from UN member countries will send personnel and join MINUSCA on peacekeeping missions. Cooperation can still be expected and remains a necessary situation for peace in CAR countries.

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